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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
CIVIL SOCIETY AND DEMOCRATIC CONSOLIDATION: THE CASE OF 
TUSIAD 
 
 
Yaman, Mine 
MA., Department of Political Science and Public Administration 
Supervisor: Assoc. Prof. Jeremy Salt 
 
June 2002 
 
 
This thesis questions the relationship between civil society and democratic 
consolidation. By referring to the development of the concept of civil society and civil 
society organizations in Turkey, this study focuses on one of the influential, 
economically powerful, protective interest group; namely TUSIAD as a case study. 
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ÖZET 
 
 
 
SİVİL TOPLUM ve DEMOKRATİK KONSALİDASYON: TÜSİAD ÖRNEĞİ 
 
 
Yaman, Mine 
MA., Siyaset Bilimi ve Kamu Yönetimi Bölümü 
Tez Yöneticisi: Doç. Dr. Jeremy Salt 
 
Haziran 2002 
 
 
Bu çalışma sivil toplum ve demokratik konsalidasyon arasında kurulabilecek 
ilişki bağlamında Türkiye`de sivil toplum kavramı ve bu tür kuruluşların gelişimi, ve 
önemli ekonomik güce sahip olan TÜSİAD (Türkiye Sanayiciler ve İşadamları Derneği) 
örneği esas alınarak betimlenmiştir. 
 
 
Anahtar Kelimeler: Sivil Toplum, Demokratik Konsalidasyon, TÜSİAD. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The concept of civil society was revived in the 1990s. For this contemporary 
‘revival’ of the idea of civil society, different reasons were given such as 
“globalization, political change in the post-Cold War era and a sense of dismay 
about the quality of society ”1; it has also been seen as “the third element of a 
comprehensive reaction against the developmental states of the 1960s and 1970s 
in which civil society is a sociological counterpart of the market in the economic 
sphere and to democracy in the political sphere ”2, or as “a cure to virtually all the 
ills of the contemporary world”3. In accordance with these developments the 
definitions of civil society are reexamined; as a result, the concept of civil society 
has obtained a new dimension with regard to the consolidation of democracy. 
 
 In the second chapter I present a theoretical framework based on the 
studies on civil society and democratic consolidation. I focus on the development 
of civil society and of civil society organizations in Turkey in the third chapter. 
                                                 
1 Alison. V Rooy,. (ed), Civil Society and the Aid Industry. (London: Earthscan Publications Ltd., 
1998), 6. 
 
2 Gordon White, “Civil Society, Democratization and Development (I): Clearing the Analytical 
Ground ”. Democratization, nr.3 1994, 375. 
 
 
3 Omar G. Encarnacion, “Civil Society and the Consolidation of Democracy in Spain”, Political 
Science Quarterly 116(1) , 2001, 53.   
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Whereas, in the forth chapter I will try to focus on TUSIAD (The Turkish 
Industrialist’s and Businessmen’s Association) so as to observe the relationship 
between civil society and the consolidation of democracy.  
 
This thesis is based on the data that is collected from the studies on civil 
society and consolidation in the form of literature review. Other methods are 
content analysis focusing on periodicals, Sabah, Hurriyet, and Milliyet and an 
interview with Can Paker who was the responsible person for the report, 
Perspectives on Democratization in Turkey initiated and prepared by TUSIAD 
in 1997. 
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CHAPTER II 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK  
 
In different time periods, the notion of civil society is labeled in different ways. 
Civil society was denoted as an antithesis to the state in the 18th century. Such a 
definition of civil society changes in the 19th century, so that civil society was 
combined with concepts like bourgeoisie, market, and liberal economy.  In 
coming to the 20th century, the notion of civil society took on a different meaning 
related to democracy.  It was perceived as an entity promoting democratization 
and/or deepening democracy. In addition, in the 21st century, the concept of civil 
society was represented by supranational/transnational civil society organizations.  
Notwithstanding these variations and shifts in the meaning of civil society from 
the 18th century onwards, according to Shils, three central characteristics have 
been sustained: “the distinction and the independence of society from the state, 
the rights of individuals, a constellation of many autonomous economic units or 
business firms acting independently of the state and competing with each other.”4  
 
 The focus of the discourse of civil society is the new emerging “non-class-
based forms of collective action oriented and linked to the legal, associational, and 
                                                 
4 Edward Shils, “The Virtue of Civil Society”, Government and Opposition 26(1) 1991, 7.  
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public institutions of society”5.  Accordingly, the term civil society is 
indispensable to grasp the changes that have occurred in Eastern Europe and Latin 
America. The reason behind this argument is that the struggles against 
authoritarian socialist party-states in Eastern Europe came from the civil society.   
  
 For Baker, the rediscovery of the concept of civil society arises from the 
fact that the opposition movements in Eastern Europe used “the idea of civil 
society in theorizing their struggle to create a protected societal sphere separate 
from the official sphere of the all-embracing party-state”6.   
 
Despite the fact that the idea of civil society has been rediscovered, some 
scholars believe that the idea of civil society is getting so popular and vague. One 
of them is Dionne who attempts to anticipate the reasons. According to him, there 
are three reasons: “a move among thinkers on both left and right reflect on the 
failures of their perspective sides and face evidence, a widespread sense that 
changes in the economy and in the organization of work, family, and 
neighborhood have outpaced the capacity of older forms of civic and associational 
life to help individuals and communities cope with the change, and the impact of 
an antigovernment mood”7.  
 
                                                 
5 L. Jean Cohen, and Adrew Arato, Civil Society and Political Theory. (USA: Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology, 1992, 2.  
 
6 Gideon Baker, “Civil Society and Democracy: the Gap between Theory and Possibility”, Politics 
18(2) 1998, 82. 
 
7 Jr. E.J. Dionne, “Why Civil Society? Why Now”, Brookings Review 15(4) 1997, 7.  
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2.1 Conceptualization of Civil Society 
 
 
In defining civil society, the shape and definition of civil society is reflected in the 
purposes to which a given group directs it. Therefore, to define civil society is 
difficult in a simple manner. Hence, it is necessary to categorize the definition of 
civil society. 
 
 
2.1.1 Civil Society in Classical Terms 
 
The notion of civil society was defined during the Enlightenment by John Locke 
in a way that “civil society played an important role as the sphere of social 
activity men entered in order to protect their individual property rights”8. 
   
 For Hegel, “the state was the protector, suggesting that civil society could 
not remain civil unless it is ordered politically, subjected to higher surveillance of 
the state”9. According to Rooy, civil society is equalized with self-interested and 
egotistical society by Hegel and, since Hegel claims that “civil society developed 
                                                 
8 J. Schwedler (ed.), Toward Civil Society in The Middle East: A Primer. (USA: Lynne Rienner 
Publishers, 1995), 3.    
 
9 Alison. V. Rooy (ed), Civil Society and the Aid Industry. (London: Earthscan Publications Ltd, 
1998), 10. 
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as a means of protecting the individual rights and needs of the privileged to 
guarantee freedom in economic, social, and cultural spheres”10. 
 
Gramsci articulates the concept of civil society as a system of control and 
exclusion. “While the state is directly responsible for violent and coercive 
methods of control, civil society enables capitalists to exert control over social 
and economic practices through nonviolent means”11. 
  
The description of civil society by Alexis de Tocqueville is “civic action 
consisting of legions of charities, lodges, fraternal orders, civic leagues, and 
religious associations”12.  For him, these associations are the indispensable 
character of American society so as to speed up the functioning of democracy.   
Tocqueville observes that the fascinating feature of civic networks is that they 
arise spontaneously from the aspirations and desires of free people.  In this regard, 
Elshtain defines civil society in a similar way to Tocqueville by denoting civil 
society as “the many forms of community and association that dot the landscape 
of a democratic culture, from families to churches to neighborhood groups to 
trade unions to self-help movements to volunteer assistance to the needy”13. 
                                                 
10 J. Schwedler (ed.), Toward Civil Society in The Middle East: A Primer. (USA: Lynne Rienner 
Publishers, 1995), 3.    
 
11 J. Schwedler (ed.), Toward Civil Society in The Middle East: A Primer. (USA: Lynne Rienner 
Publishers, 1995), 4.    
 
12 Don E Eberly, (ed.), The Essential Civil Society Reader: the Classical Essays. (Maryland: 
Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2000), 7.   
 
13 Jean B Elshtain,. “A Call to Civil Society”, Society 36(5) 1998, 103. 
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To Elshtain, civil society refers to “relationships and institutions like 
families, neighborhood life, and the network of religious, economic, educational, 
and civic associations that are neither created nor controlled by the state”14.   
 
 
2.1.2 Contemporary Definitions of Civil Society 
 
Hall explains civil society as an ideal capable of social embodiment. That is to 
say, civil society is “a form of societal self-organization which allows for 
cooperation with the state whilst enabling individuation”15.  
 
The notion of civil society is interpreted differently by many scholars. 
Zaki identifies civil society as an “aspect of social life that is distinct and removed 
from the realm of the state-a collective entity that exists apart from the state”16. 
The concept is based on the free individual and the community consisting of free 
individuals that are free from the control of the state; nevertheless, their activities 
are regulated by law, that is to say, civil society is a public realm for the voluntary 
activities of autonomous individuals.  
   
                                                                                                                                     
 
14 Jean B Elshtain,. “A Call to Civil Society”, Society 36(5) 1998, 103. 
 
15 John A. Hall, “The Nature of Civil Society ”, Society 35(4) 1998, 32. 
 
16 Moheb Zaki, Civil Society and Democratization in Egypt, 1981-1994. (Cairo: The Ibn Khaldun 
Center, 1994), 4. 
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 In delineating civil society, Eberly identifies civil society as a noun 
surrounding “a social realm consisting of a range of actual institutions with moral 
substance and function”17. 
 
  According to Rooy, the concept of civil society is categorized as “values 
and norms, space for action, historical monument and antidote to the State”18. In 
the first analysis, civil society is described as the ideal one in which “ambitions 
such as trust, tolerance, and cooperation are held to be universal and to be 
universally good”19. For Seligman, “two centuries after its origins in the 
Enlightenment, the idea of civil society is being reviewed to provide the answer to 
the greater good of society and, similarly, how society can advance the interests of 
the individuals who comprise it ”20. 
       
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
17 Don E Eberly, (ed.), The Essential Civil Society Reader: the Classical Essays. (Maryland: 
Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2000), 7.   
 
18 Alison. V. Rooy (ed), Civil Society and the Aid Industry. (London: Earthscan Publications Ltd, 
1998), 12. 
 
19Alison. V. Rooy (ed), Civil Society and the Aid Industry. (London: Earthscan Publications Ltd, 
1998), 12. 
 
20 Gary B. Madison, The Political Economy of Civil Society and human Rights. (New York: 
Routledge, 1998), 10 . 
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2.1.2.1 Civil Society as a Space for Action 
 
While classifying civil society as a space for action, the term is depicted as “one 
of the three spheres, together with State and market, that interface in the making 
of democratic societies”21.  Another notion of space is that “civil society is a space 
or arena between household and State which affords possibilities of concerted 
action and self-organization”22. In addition, Larry Diamond describes civil society 
as  “the sphere that battles the State and keeps it check”23. Diamond asserts the 
concept of civil society as: 
 
The realm of organized social life that is voluntary, self-
generating, self-supporting, autonomous from the State, and 
bound by a legal order or set of shared values. It is distinct 
from society in general in that it involves citizens acting 
collectively in a public sphere to express their interests, 
passions, and ideas, exchange information, achieve mutual 
goals, make demands on the State and hold State officials 
accountable. 
                                                                                                        
(Diamond, 1994:5) 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
21 Gary B. Madison, The Political Economy of Civil Society and human Rights. (New York: 
Routledge, 1998), 19 . 
 
22 Alison. V. Rooy (ed), Civil Society and the Aid Industry. (London: Earthscan Publications Ltd, 
1998), 19. Also see Percy.B Lehning,  “Towards a Multicultural Civil Society: The Role of Social 
Capital and Democratic Citizenship ”. Government and Opposition, nr 1, 1998, 222. 
  
23 Larry Diamond, “Rethinking Civil Society: Toward Democratic Consolidation”, Journal of 
Democracy 5(3) 1994, 5. 
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        Linz and Stepan share similar views with Diamond in a way that civil 
society refers to the “arena of the polity where self-organizing and relatively 
autonomous groups, movements, and individuals attempt to articulate values, to 
create associations and solidarities, and to advance their interests ”24.  
 
Seligman also limns civil society as an “arena where free, self-determining 
individuality sets forth its claims for satisfaction of its wants and personal 
autonomy”25. Likewise, civil society is depicted as “recognition by the state that 
individuals, informal groups, and formal institutions should be free to pursue their 
interests and ideals independent of the state in most spheres of life ”26.  
 
For Shils, “ the idea of civil society is the idea of a part of society which 
has a life of its own, which is distinctly different from the state, and which is 
largely in autonomy from it”27. According to Shils, there are three main 
components of the idea of civil society: “a part of society involving a complex of 
autonomous institutions, a complex of relationships between itself and the state 
and a distinctive set of institutions which safeguards the separation of state and 
civil society, and a widespread pattern of refined or civil manners”28.   
                                                 
24 Juan J. Linz, and Alfred Stepan, “Toward Consolidated Democracies”,  Journal of Democracy 
7(2) 1996, 17. 
 
25 Adam D. Seligman, The Idea of Civil Society. (New York: Free Press, 1992), 5. 
 
26 R. Rose,  “Problems of Postcommunism: Toward A Civil Economy”. Journal of Democracy.  
April 1992, 13. 
 
27 Edward Shils, “The Virtue of Civil Society”, Government and Opposition 26(1) 1991,3.  
 
28 Edward Shils, “The Virtue of Civil Society”, Government and Opposition 26(1) 1991,4.  
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The term civil society is depicted as “a network of groups and associations 
between families and face-to-face groups on one side and out-right state 
organizations on the other, mediating between individual and state, private and 
public”29 by Cohen and Arato. According to Madison, a civil society is “one 
which expressly seeks to safeguard the autonomy of the different spheres of 
human agency”30 comparing to the oppressive homogeneity of the totalitarian 
state.  For him, civil society is a pluralistic society in contrast to the monolithic 
totalitarian state. Indeed, the notion of civil society as a space for action overlaps 
with a pluralistic view of civil society in which the arbitrary use of the State 
power is challenged or limited, and the individual is protected against the unjust 
State actions.  Consequently, “civil society is one which expressly seeks to 
safeguard the autonomy of the different spheres of human agency and is an 
intrinsically pluralistic society”31.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
29 L. Jean Cohen, and Adrew Arato, Civil Society and Political Theory. (USA: Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology, 1992), 48.  
 
30 Gary B. Madison, The Political Economy of Civil Society and human Rights. (New York: 
Routledge, 1998), 14. 
 
31 Gary B. Madison, The Political Economy of Civil Society and human Rights. (New York: 
Routledge, 1998), 14. 
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2.1.2.2 Civil Society as a Historical Moment 
 
In accordance with Rooy’s classification, the third notion describes civil society as 
an historical moment in which it is tried to find answer to the question of how civil 
society emerges. Seligman responds to the question by suggesting prerequisites for 
the existence of civil society: “the primacy of the individual, rights-bearing and 
autonomous, and a shared public space in which agreed rules and norms are 
sustained and followed ”32. Similarly, Gellner argues that “the historical and social 
prerequisites for a civil society are notably the creation of atomized liberal 
individuals”33.  
 
 
2.1.2.3 Civil Society as an Antithesis to the State  
 
In categorizing the concept of civil society, according to Rooy, the last viewpoint 
is that civil society is the antithesis to the State. “Civil society’s chief virtue is its 
ability to act as an organized counterweight to the State”34. Thus, the promotion of 
civil society is perceived as limiting the State. 
 
                                                 
32 Alison. V. Rooy (ed), Civil Society and the Aid Industry. (London: Earthscan Publications Ltd, 
1998), 21. 
 
33 Alison. V. Rooy (ed), Civil Society and the Aid Industry. (London: Earthscan Publications Ltd, 
1998), 21. 
 
34 Michael W. Foley, and Bob Edwards, “The Paradox of Civil Society”, Journal of Democracy 
7(3) 1996, 39.  
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 With regard to this notion, Keane states that civil society and the state are 
at the opposite ends, and “the term ‘civil society’ has been granted a kind of 
natural innocence and deployed as a poorly defined synonym for other forms of 
private life which are supposed to be good because of their opposition to the State 
power ”35. To White, civil society is not entirely separate from the State, but is “an 
intermediate associational realm between State and family populated by 
organizations which are separate from the State, enjoy autonomy in relation to the 
State and are formed voluntarily by members of society to protect or extend their 
interests or values”36.   
 
  
2.1.2.4 Civil Society as a Democratic Institution Builder 
 
Apart from these, another description of civil society, as a democratic institution 
builder, needs to be added.  Larry Diamond offers “the most comprehensive 
theoretical assessments of the virtue of civil society in the context of democratic 
transition and consolidation”37 which I shall refer to again later. There is a strong 
link between a healthy civil society and the existence of democracy.  Civil society 
arises with the development of democracy.  
 
                                                 
35 John Keane, Civil Society and the State. (New York: Verso, 1988),13. 
 
36 Gordon White,. “Civil Society, Democratization and Development (I): Clearing the Analytical 
Ground ”. Democratization, nr.3, 1994, 379. 
 
37 Omar G. Encarnacion, “Civil Society and the Consolidation of Democracy in Spain”, Political 
Science Quarterly 116(1) 2001, 56.   
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“The institution of civil society is the necessary condition of possibility of 
democracy, i.e., of a regime dedicated to the respect, recognition, and 
enhancement of universal human rights ”38.  Hence, civil society is seen an 
essential ingredient in democratization and in the health of established 
democracies by Madison. 
 
 
2.1.2.5 Civil Society as a Preferred Setting   
 
Beyond these considerations, Michael Walzer has a different opinion about the 
concept of civil society. Walzer attempts to answer the following question: ‘What 
is the preferred setting for a good life?’ He claims that four ideologies, socialism, 
capitalism, nationalism and communitarianism are unable to answer the question 
due to their ‘single-mindedness’. Walzer presumes civil society as a fifth and the 
newest answer which “holds that the good life can only be lived in civil society, 
the realm of fragmentation and struggle but also of concrete and authentic 
solidarities”39 Walzer defines civil society as a “setting of setting: all are included, 
none is preferred”40.  
 
 
 
                                                 
38 Gary B. Madison, The Political Economy of Civil Society and human Rights. (New York: 
Routledge, 1998), 8.  
 
39 Michael  Walzer, “Rescuing Civil Society”, Dissent 46(1) 1999.  
 
40 Michael  Walzer (ed.), Toward a Global Civil Society. (Oxford: Berghahn Books, 1995), 16.. 
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2.1.2.6 Paradoxes of Civil Society 
 
 
There are many paradoxes of civil society in respect to its meaning and its 
relationship with the state and democracy. In the first place, civil society is 
paradoxical insofar as it is rooted in individualization as well as in collectivism.  
Such a combination is stated by Habermas as “the sphere of private people come 
together as a public”41. There is a tension between the particular rights and 
obligations, and the collective membership in a civil society organization. The 
ideal notion of civil society emphases the respect for individual rights and 
freedoms as well as pluralism; however, the practices of civil society function on 
the behalf of the collectivity. Thus, the duality between the individualization and 
collectivity occurs. 
 
 A second paradoxical dimension of civil society is that definitions in 
which civil society is depicted as ‘the realm of social activities’ are too broad 
since such activities include “privately owned, market-oriented, voluntarily run 
and friendship-based organizations”42. The problem is that these definitions are 
unable to differentiate civil society from the spheres of ideological, religious and 
family life. For Alexander, these patterns must be carefully kept distinct43. 
 
                                                 
41 Jeffrey C. Alexander, “Paradoxes of Civil Society”. International Sociology.  12(2) 1997,125. 
 
42 Jeffrey C. Alexander, “Paradoxes of Civil Society”. International Sociology.  12(2) 1997,126. 
 
43 Jeffrey C. Alexander, “Paradoxes of Civil Society”. International Sociology.  12(2) 1997,126. 
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Another paradox is that “civil society can never be separated from the 
state”44.  Many thinkers define civil society as a realm distinct from the state or as 
a counterweight to the state. However, the state provides a legal framework for 
civil society to the extent that it is useful for the constitution of the latter. In this 
regard, civil society is connected with the state that is the provider of the legal and 
civil order.   
 
The ideal type of civil society emphasizing the qualities of separation, 
autonomy, and voluntary association contradicts the empirical world in which 
civil society is embedded. For White, the reason is that in the empirical world, 
“the boundaries between state and civil society are often blurred: states may play 
an important role in shaping civil society as well as vice-versa, the two 
organizational spheres may overlap to varying degrees”45.  
     
Civil society is portrayed as an autonomous sphere of social power within 
which citizens enable to pressure authoritarians for change, and democratize from 
below. Foley and Edwards concern that “if civil society is a beachhead secure 
enough to be of use in thwarting tyrannical regimes, what prevents it from being 
used to undermine democratic governments?”46. The irony is that on the one hand 
it is desirable for civil society to be autonomous from the state and be strong 
enough to counterweight to the state; on the other hand such autonomy and 
                                                 
44 David Held, Models of Democracy. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1987), 281. 
 
45 Gordon White, “Civil Society, Democratization and Development (I): Clearing the Analytical 
Ground ”. Democratization, 1994, nr.3, 381. 
 
46 Michael W. Foley, and Bob Edwards, “The Paradox of Civil Society”, Journal of Democracy 
7(3) 1996, 46.  
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strength should be limited to the extent that civil society ought not to challenge 
governing institutions to obtain particular needs and aspirations. Hence, an 
unlimited freedom of association for political ends is not tolerated. 
 
A different kind of paradox is inequality within the realm of civil society 
in which a variety of social groups attempt to accumulate resources and provide 
services. Yet, all of them do not have the same capacity to acquire those resources 
and services.  Walzer argues that “ all forms of inequality are reflected and even 
magnified in the organizational life of civil society ”47.  Similarly, Trentmann 
states that “there is no such thing as a civil society without some conflict and 
inequality”48. However, ideally civil society is rooted in self-help and mutual aid. 
The main core of civil society is voluntary giving money and of time and energy. 
According to Walzer, all different groups within civil society should have 
capabilities of serving their own members and of providing services. In doing so, 
the engagement of the state is required. Consequently, a contradiction between 
ideally having a sufficient material and institutional base and practically having 
no access to recourses which necessitates the state involvement.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
47 Michael Walzer, “Rescuing Civil Society”, Dissent 46(1), 1999, 63.  
 
48 Frank Trentmann, Paradoxes of Civil Society: New Perspectives on Modern German and British 
History. (New York: Berghahn Books, 1999). 
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Similarly, White argues that it is a paradox that some sort of civil society 
organizations with greater access to socio-economic resources are able to find it 
easier to organize effectively and vice-versa. Thus, there is a tendency to reinforce 
unequal relations. 
 
Fragmentation is also one of paradoxes of civil society. Walzer states that 
civil society associations are excessively particularistic since they try to advance 
particular interests that conflict with other particular interests49. Besides, civil 
society organizations tend to promote differences that might create social 
cleavages in the society. Regarding to fragmentation, Walzer articulates the 
fragmentation within the realm of civil society as dangerous because the divisive 
characteristic of civil society makes democratic politics problematic. The 
representation of diversification takes place among the basic features of civil 
society; however, it is claimed that such a diversification ought not to reach a 
level of fragmentation. Thus, Walzer prefers moderate associational difference 
vis-à-vis divisive civil society organizations. 
 
The main function of civil society is to foster civic involvement and 
political participation; yet it is unlikely to promote democratic health in the same 
way or to the same extent by all associations. Therefore, such an unbalance 
creates a paradox. 
 
                                                 
49 Michael Walzer, “Rescuing Civil Society”, Dissent 46(1), 1999, 65.  
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Somehow civil society is identified with the entirety of social life rooted 
outside the state and the economy According to Alexander, such an attempt to 
agglomerate various institutions and cultural patterns must be corrected in a way 
that they must be much more carefully kept distinct. Likewise, Trentmann claims 
that it may helpful to differentiate between types and degrees of civil society. 
 
There is always a danger in the idea of civil society so that plurality and 
inequality, tolerance and discrimination go hand in hand in civil society 
organizations.   Therefore, to create the balance between inclusion and exclusion 
is difficult.  
 
 
2.2 Conceptualization of Democratic Consolidation 
 
The concept of democratic consolidation became popular in the 1990s. According 
to Linz and Stepan, consolidation is the process of deepening the commitments 
made in the ritual transition to democracy and making habits routine50. Linz and 
Stepan depicts a set of conditions for democratic consolidation:  
 
“The consolidated democracy includes a civil society 
that is active enough to make its interests felt by the new 
government, a political society consisting of political 
institutions-parties, elections, electoral rules, leadership- 
that can structure and monitor the democratic 
government, a rule of law that is autonomous and 
generally applicable standards applied by an independent 
judiciary in a ‘sprit of constitutionalism’, a bureaucracy 
                                                 
50 Diana R. Gordon, “Democratic Consolidation and Community Policing: Confilicting 
Imperatives in South Africa”, Policing and Society, nr.11, 2001, 122. 
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that is usable for governmental functions like taxing, 
regulation and the provision of basic services, and an 
economic society with a capacity to balance the interest 
of state and market”51. 
 
 The meaning of the term ‘democratic consolidation’ is the challenge of 
making new democracies secure, extending their life expectancy beyond the short 
term, making them immune against the threat of authoritarian regression52. 
According to Schedler, democratic consolidation should include such divergent 
items as popular legitimation, the diffusion of democratic values, the 
neutralization of anti-system actors, civilian supremacy over the military, the 
elimination of authoritarian enclaves, party building, the organization of 
functional interests, the stabilization of electoral rules, the routinization of 
politics, the decentralization of state power, and economic stability53. 
 
 Gordon states that consolidation of democracy goes beyond procedural 
guarantees- elections, political representation and open political debate. For 
Gordon, consolidation of democracy includes operational expectations that 
citizens will be able to influence government and exercise individual rights and 
that government will give citizens at least some of what they want54. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
51 Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, “Toward Consolidated Democracies”, Journal of Democracy, 
7(2), 1996, 18. 
52  Andreas Schedler, “What is Democratic Consolidation”, Journal of Democracy, 98(2), 91. 
53  Andreas Schedler, “What is Democratic Consolidation”, Journal of Democracy, 98(2), 92. 
54  Diana R. Gordon, “Democratic Consolidation and Community Policing: Confilicting 
Imperatives in South Africa”, Policing and Society, nr.11, 2001, 125. 
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2.3 The Role of Civil Society in Democratic Consolidation 
 
The first and basic function of civil society is to provide “the basis for the 
limitation of state power, hence for the control of the state by society, and hence 
for democratic political institutions as the most means of exercising that 
control”55. White argues that civil society can alter the balance of power between 
state and society in favor of the latter56.  Thus, civil society is a vital instrument 
for monitoring and restraining the exercise of power by the State. By doing so, 
civil society also prevents any single group or ideology from dominating society; 
hence, sustains “open spaces for diverse views and interests”57.  
 
Similarly, Huntington argues that civil society is one of the preconditions 
for democracy to the extent that a widely differentiated and articulated social 
structure consisting of autonomous groups appears because such groups are 
necessary to “provide the basis for the limitation of state power, hence for the 
control of the state by society, hence for democratic political institutions as the 
most effective means of exercising that control”58.  Thus, the very function of 
civil society during the consolidation period is to limit state power that leads to 
                                                 
55 Samuel P. Huntington, “Will More Countries Become Democratic”. Political Science Quarterly, 
nr. 99, 204. 
 
56 Gordon White, “Civil Society, Democratization and Development (I): Clearing the Analytical 
Ground ”. Democratization, 1994, nr.3, 382. 
 
57 Frank Trentmann, Paradoxes of Civil Society: New Perspectives on Modern German and 
British History. (New York: Berghahn Books, 1999). 
 
58 Samuel P. Huntington, “Will More Countries Become Democratic”. Political Science Quarterly, 
nr. 99, 203. 
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the control of the state by society and to exercise that control by democratic 
political institutions.  
 
Elshtain articulates the potential of civil society as  “the best conceptual 
framework for understanding and responding to the most urgent challenge facing 
our society: the moral renewal of our democratic project ”59. To him, the main 
task of civil society is to promote competence and character in individuals, build 
social trust, and help individuals to become good citizens. According to Elshtain, 
civil society is the sphere concerned with moral formation and with ends as well 
as with administration and the maximizing means. 
 
Eberly mentions the practical functions of civil society as cultivating 
citizenship and generating democratic values. According to him, civil society 
undertakes theses roles by “socializing infants into adults and transform private 
individuals into public-spirited citizens”60. The reason behind this role of civil 
society is Eberly’s argument that public space, a place where people learn the very 
essential democratic habits such as trust, collaboration and compromise in a 
practical way, is provided by civil society61.  
 
 
                                                 
59 The term ‘our’ refers to Americans. Jean B. Elshtain, “A Call to Civil Society”, Society 36(5) 
1998. 
 
60 Don E. Eberly (ed.), The Essential Civil Society Reader: the Classical Essays. (Maryland: 
Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2000), 3.   
 
61 The understanding of democratic functions of civil society for Eberly is seemingly a 
sociological one compared to other scholars dealing with civil society.  
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A vibrant civil society is the necessary task for sustaining democracy so 
that the civil society performs many democratic functions. Eberly asserts three 
main practical tasks of civil society: “to mediate between the individual and the 
large mega-structures of the market and the state, to temper the negative social 
tendencies associated with each, to create important social capital, and to impart 
democratic values and habits”62. In addition, the very role of civil society 
regarding to maintaining democracy is that civil society enables to build social 
ties and a sense of mutual obligation in a way that it coalesces isolated individuals 
around common objectives. Thus, for Eberly, the reciprocal ties nourished in civil 
society augment the vital role of civil society with respect to promoting 
democracy.  
 
Przeworski identifies civil society as one of the variables that are critical to 
the sustainability of democratic regimes.63 According to Przeworski, a well-
organized and vibrant civil society enables to check the power of government, 
hold the leadership accountable, and promote a strong sense of citizenship among 
the public. 
 
The effectiveness of civil society so as to deepen democracy depends on 
the civility of individuals. Shils articulates such a civility as the virtue of civil 
society which is “the readiness to moderate particular, individual or parochial 
                                                 
62 Don E. Eberly (ed.), The Essential Civil Society Reader: the Classical Essays. (Maryland: 
Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2000), 7.   
 
63 The other variables are the choice of parliamentarism versus presidentalism, the economy’s 
potential, and the external political environment in James and Caliguire, 1996 p. 60  
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interests and to give precedence to the common good”64.  According to him, the 
virtue of civil society is developed within the civil society itself.    
   
  Diamond claims that “civil society supplements the role of political 
parties in stimulating political participation, increasing the political efficacy and 
skill of democratic citizens, and promoting an appreciation of the obligations as 
well as the rights of democratic citizenships”65. Another way in which civil 
society serves democratic consolidation is to inculcate democratic attributes such 
as tolerance, moderation, willingness to compromise, and respect for opposing 
viewpoints. Hence, these norms and values emerge through experience. 
 
 According to Diamond, another function of civil society is to augment the 
representativeness of democracy by creating channels for articulation, aggregation 
and representation of interests66. Thus, historically excluded groups such as 
women, and minorities are able to provide access to power. Besides, civil society 
serves democratic consolidation by recruiting and training new political leaders. 
Through this way, political arena is revitalized and renewed. In doing so, the 
established patterns are remodeled.  
 
Beyond leadership training, civil society possesses explicit democracy-
building purposes. “Election-monitoring groups, the massive voter education and 
                                                 
64  Edward Shils, “The Virtue of Civil Society”, Government and Opposition 26(1), 1991, 16.  
 
65 Larry Diamond, “Rethinking Civil Society: Toward Democratic Consolidation”, Journal of 
Democracy 5(3) 1994,7. 
 
66 Larry Diamond, Juan J. Linz, and Seymour M. Lipset, Politics in Developing Countries. (USA: 
Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1995), 28. 
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monitoring efforts, human rights groups, think tanks devoted to democratic 
reform, and public anticorruption groups”67 play a vital role in consolidation of 
democracy. 
 
 In addition, Diamond claims that legitimacy and governability are 
reinforced by civil society to the extent that it enhances accountability, 
responsiveness, inclusiveness, and legitimacy of political system. Consequently, 
the ability of the State to govern is improved; in turn the respect of citizens for the 
State is boosted. Similarly, White states that a strong civil society can play “a 
disciplinary role in relation to the state by enforcing standards of public morality 
and performance and improving the accountability of both politicians and 
administrators”68. 
  
 In analyzing roles of civil society in consolidation of democracy, another 
significant function of civil society is to play an “intermediary transmission-belt 
between state and society”69. Civil society enables to facilitate political 
communication between state and society in which demands are transmitted, and 
the interests of the population are articulated. 
 
                                                 
67 Larry Diamond, Juan J. Linz, and Seymour M. Lipset, Politics in Developing Countries. (USA: 
Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1995), 29. 
 
68 Gordon White, “Civil Society, Democratization and Development (I): Clearing the Analytical 
Ground ”. Democratization, 1994, nr.3, 383. 
 
69 Gordon White, “Civil Society, Democratization and Development (I): Clearing the Analytical 
Ground ”. Democratization, 1994, nr.3, 384. 
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Moreover, civil society plays a constitutive role redefining the rules of the 
political game. It is argued that “civil society creates and sustains a set of new 
democratic norms which regulate the behavior of the state and the character of 
political relations between state and the public sphere of society and individual 
citizens ”70. 
 
According to Hall, the presence of two elements of civil society help 
towards democratic consolidation. The first one is the existence of strong and 
autonomous groups enabling to balance “excessive concentrations of power”71. 
The presence of civil society is able to push political parties to represent the 
people, to ensure the adoption of better policies, and to mediate political conflict. 
Secondly, civil society maintains social diversity. Hall claims that on the contrary 
to “civic virtue that sought to make human beings unitary”72, civil society 
functions on the behalf of the diversity. 
 
Robert Putnam reviews the concept of civil society by labeling it as 
‘networks of civic engagement’. For Putnam, the chief virtue of networks of civic 
engagement is to “foster robust norms of reciprocity, to facilitate communication 
and improve the flow of information about trustworthiness of individuals”73. 
Networks of civic engagement are an essential form of social capital which 
                                                 
70 Gordon White, “Civil Society, Democratization and Development (I): Clearing the Analytical 
Ground ”. Democratization, 1994, nr.3, 384. 
 
71 David Held, Models of Democracy. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1987), 281. 
 
72 John A. Hall,  Prospects for Democracy. David Held, ed. (Oxford: Polity Press, 1993), 282.  
 
73 Robert D. Putnam, Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy. (New Jersey: 
Princeton University Press, 1993),173. 
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“bolsters the performance of the polity and the economy”74.  According to 
Putnam, social capital is “the key to making democracy work”75. There are two 
sources of social capital; norms of generalized reciprocity and networks of civic 
engagement that encourage social trust and cooperation so that “they reduce 
incentives to defect, reduce uncertainty, and provide models for future 
cooperation”76. 
 
This chapter was in an attempt to draw a theoretical framework on the 
relationship between civil society and democratic consolidation. The next chapter 
will try to understand the development of the concept of civil society and of civil 
society organizations. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
74 Michael W. Foley, and Bob Edwards, “The Paradox of Civil Society”, Journal of Democracy 
7(3) 1996, 40.  
 
75 Robert D. Putnam, Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy. (New Jersey: 
Princeton University Press, 1993),185. 
 
76 Robert D. Putnam, Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy. (New Jersey: 
Princeton University Press, 1993),177. 
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CHAPTER III 
CIVIL SOCIETY AND TURKEY 
 
This chapter refers to the studies that are conducted on the development of the 
concept of civil society and of civil society organizations in Turkey. According to 
these studies, such developments are categorized under four historical periods: 
The Ottoman period, the period of the Republic, pre-1980 period, and post-1980 
period. 
 
 
3.1. The Ottoman Period 
 
The question of the relationship of the state to civil society is deeply rooted in the 
Ottoman legacy in which there was a long tradition of a dominant state controlling 
the social fabric of a multi-religious and multi-ethnic empire.  
 
The question of the existence of civil society in the Ottoman Empire is 
understood in different ways. The first track accepts the availability of the civil 
society in the Ottoman Period to the extent that there was the element of civil 
society which is peculiar to the Ottoman Empire differing from the emergence of 
civil society in Europe. However, the second point of view denies the existence of 
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civil society in the Ottoman Empire. For those who hold this view, the Ottoman 
state did not allow for the development of a civil society and the emergence of an 
autonomous class which could play a leading role in modernization.77 It is argued 
that the Ottoman and Republican intellectuals and statesmen were concerned with 
the strengthening of state authority and power rather than limiting state power. 
Therefore, the cleavage between the center and the periphery, between the state 
and civil society goes back to the Ottoman period, and continues into to the 
Republican era. The state’s dominance over civil society is seen until the 1980s.  
 
Serif Mardin merges the concept of civil society with the word 
‘civilization’. According to Mardin, the idea of civil society elucidates the degree 
of the civilization.78 Therefore, for Mardin, there are two important elements in 
the emergence of civil society: the guarantee of the living space separated from 
the state and the autonomy of the economic facilities. 79  
 
 Mardin claims that the European type of civil society did not take root in 
the Ottoman Empire; however, he regards the ummet structure, and tarikats as 
secondary structures in Durkheim’s terms representing civil society in at least its 
functional characteristics, and acting as a buffer between the state and the 
individual.80  According to Mardin, market forces in the Ottoman Empire were 
never independent in the European sense; hence, civil society in the European 
sense could not emerge in the Ottoman Empire. Instead, religious organizations 
                                                 
77 Binnaz Toprak, ‘The State, Politics, and Religion in Turkey’, in Metin Heper and Ahmet Evin 
ed., State, Democracy, and the Military: Turkey in the 1980s, (W. de Gunter: Berlin, 1988), 119. 
78 Serif Mardin, Cumhuriyet Donemi Turkiye  Ansiklopedisi,  VII, Iletisim Yayinlari, 1918.  
79 Serif Mardin tries to express the concept of civil society with the help of those elements.   
80 Serif Mardin, Din ve Ideoloji (Istanbul: Iletisim Yayinlari, 1993), 96.   
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placed between the state and the individual resulted in the emergence of a ‘quasi 
civil society’ that mostly fulfilled the functions of civil society.81  
 
The Ottoman Empire was a patriarchal state based on traditions in the 
sense defined by Max Weber. According to Halil Inalcik, the maintenance of 
traditional structures and values by laws was the main purpose of the Ottoman 
Empire.82 The Ottoman Empire was composed of two classes: ulema83 and 
reaya84. Inalcik includes in the latter, merchants, and artisans and describes them 
as civil society. For Inalcik, civil society in the Ottoman Empire established its 
economic rules, and to get autonomy to some extent; however, the state desired to 
control the existing system for its interests.  In this sense, it is argued that there 
was a state-civil society distinction in the Ottoman Empire.  
 
According to Omer Caha, state-society relation should be divided into two 
periods; pre-16th century, and post-16th century. In the former period, the Ottoman 
State fostered a peculiar type of civil society elements that were ahilik and lonca85 
in the economic realm, and tarikats in the cultural realm. Caha claims that those 
civil society elements were able to define the political norms as well as to take on 
the duty of becoming a kind of linkage between the state and the society so that 
                                                 
81 Osman Arslan, Sivil Toplum ve Turkiye  Gercegi (Istanbul: Bayrak Yayincilik, 2001), 67. 
82 Inalcik asserts that the Ottoman Empire functioned like an umbrella consisting of a variety of 
civil groups, and the Empire did not prefer to destruct those groups in Halil Inalcik, ‘Tarihsel 
Baglamda Sivil Toplum ve Tarikatlar’, in E. Fuat Keyman and A. Yasar Saribay ed., 
Kuresellesme, Sivil Toplum ve Islam (Ankara: Vadi Yayinlari, 1997), 79.    
83 Islamic scholars in the Ottoman Empire.  
84 The ruled who paid taxes to the state. 
85 The merchant organizations with a strong religious coloring in the Ottoman Empire. 
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the state was no longer an obstacle to the growth of an independent civil society.86 
This period was the peak of tolerance and freedom in the Ottoman Empire.  
 
Apart from tarikats and loncas, the millet system and multi-legal system 
were the other civil society elements in the Ottoman Empire. The millet system 
possessed the pluralist character in its core. Since the millet system essentially had 
an autonomous status, it formed a kind of civil society at the organizational level. 
The multi-legal system contained the supportive feature for the millet system.    
 
On the contrary, the second view argues that the Ottoman State was 
characterized by a strong state tradition.87  According to Ergun Ozbudun, the 
strong state was centralized, autonomous and occupied a highly valued place in 
the political culture; in short it was a status-oriented rather than market-oriented.88   
Ozbudun claims that the emergence of a powerful merchant class that was very 
influential in the process of civil society building was not favored by the Ottoman 
State. Besides, the weakness of civil society in the Ottoman Empire was related to 
the weakness of local governments. Since the vast territories of the Ottoman 
Empire were ruled not by local bodies, but by centrally appointed governors, the 
Ottoman state had no tradition of independent, autonomous municipalities.89 For 
Ozbudun, the excessive centralization of the state authority and its concentration 
                                                 
86 Omer Caha, ‘1980 Sonrasi Turkiye’sinde Sivil Toplum Arayislari’, Yeni Turkiye 18 (1997),  35. 
See also Omer Caha, Turkiye’de Sivil Toplum ve Kadin, (Ankara: Vadi yayinlari, 1996). 
87 The concept of strong state has been used peculiarly by Metin Heper, see Metin Heper, Strong 
State Tradition, (Walkington: Eothen, 1985).   
88 Ergun Ozbudun, Contemporary Turkish Politics, (Lynne Rienner Publishers:  Boulder, Colo, 
2000), 126. 
89 Ergun Ozbudun, ‘Turkey: Crises, Interruptions, and Reequilibrations’, in Lary Diamond, 
Politics in developing countries: comparing experiences with democracy, (L. Rienner Publishers:  
Boulder, 1995), 250. 
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in the hands of state authority was the basic factor for the weakness of civil 
society in the Ottoman State. As a consequence, autonomous and intermediary 
social structures playing a cushioning role between the state and the individual did 
not emerge in the Ottoman Empire.90 At this point, Ozbudun ignores the presence 
of tarikats and especially esnafs. In fact, Ozbudun tries to find a civil society 
comparative to that which existed in Europe; however, it can be argued that there 
existed a peculiar kind of civil society in the Ottoman Empire.    
 
According to Ozbudun, the strict separation between the rulers and the 
ruled and the absence of a representative system did not permit the traditional 
pluralism, as mentioned before, to evolve into the pluralistic infrastructure of a 
modern democratic state.91  
 
Another view is that the negative developments against civil society in the 
Ottoman State started through the modernization period in the 19th century. 
According to Caha, reforms in the legal system in particular created the 
infrastructure of a monist structure92 contrary to the pluralist social structure in the 
Ottoman Empire. Moreover, an elite group dominating and controlling the whole 
society continued its existence 
 
                                                 
90 Ozbudun names those intermediary structures as the church, guilds and autonomous cities in the 
Europe.  
91 Ergun Ozbudun, Contemporary Turkish Politics,  (Lynne  Rienner Publishers:  Boulder, Colo, 
2000), 128. 
92  Omer Caha, ‘1980 Sonrasi Turkiye’sinde Sivil Toplum Arayislari’, Yeni Turkiye 18 (1997) 
Caha explains the details of the creation of the monism. 
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It is commonly argued that state-society relations in Turkey have 
displayed a dominant center and weak periphery mode stemming from the 
Ottoman period.  According to Binnaz Toprak, through this coercive state 
understanding, the center is perennially suspicious of civil society which it is tries 
to co-opt, control and suppress.93   
 
Although some argue that civil society did not emerge in the Ottoman state 
in the European sense because of the strong state tradition, there were structures 
that were independent and mediated with the state. Tarikats, loncas, ahi guilds 
and millet system constructed the peculiar character of civil society in the 
Ottoman Empire. 
 
My purpose is not to explore the Ottoman history, but I included the 
Ottoman period because of the sense that it is necessary to build a link between 
the Ottoman era and the Republican era in a sense that some scholars argue that in 
the Republican period, a kind of civil society elements that existed in the Ottoman 
period was dissolved. Therefore, the Ottoman period was included in analyzing 
the existence of civil society in Turkey. Also, I am aware of the fact that 
democratic consolidation and civil society are modern phenomenon, and these 
concepts are operational within the nation-state. However, the Ottoman state was 
an empire. Nevertheless, I put the Ottoman era in this chapter so as to build a 
linkage with the Republican period.  
 
                                                 
93 Binnaz Toprak, ‘Civil Society in Turkey: The Relationship of the State to Civil Society’, in 
Richard Norton Augustus, ed., Civil Society in the Middle East, (E.J.Brill : Leiden , 1995), 89. 
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 3.2. The Period of the Republic 
 
The most destructive obstacles to civil society in Turkey emerged in the first years 
of the Republic. The single party period inherited a deficient or faint civil society 
from the Ottoman State.94 According to Caha,  medrese, tarikats and vakifs as 
well as economic groups, political parties, and media existed in the last years of 
the Empire. However, these civil society organizations lost their functions and 
importance in the single party years due to the objective of homogenization of the 
party and the state. Even more, it is argued that there were policies to prevent and 
even to destroy the civil society elements in society. 95 Caha claims that since the 
state elites considered civil society as an obstacle to Turkish modernization, they 
started to liquidate the whole civil society.   
  
 The single party period is the era of the construction of the state structure 
in Turkey. In these years, there was an attempt to depart from the Ottoman 
traditional state structure and to create a modern society and state.  Moreover, 
Erdogan-Tosun claims, the position of society vis-à-vis the state and the space 
between the state and the society started to change in the Single Party Period96 in 
favor of the state.  
 
 It is strongly asserted that a bureaucratic society rather than civil society 
was created as a result of modernization attempt in the period of the Republic. 
                                                 
94 Omer Caha, ‘1980 Sonrasi Turkiye’sinde Sivil Toplum Arayislari’, Yeni Turkiye 18 (1997), 36.  
95 In these years, the main objective of the State was to reach the level of the advance societes 
through the modernization.   
96 Gulgun Erdogan-Tosun, Demokratiklesme  Perspektifinden  Devlet-Sivil Toplum Iliskisi, (Alfo 
Basim: Isnabul-Bursa, 2001), 257.   
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The modernist view separated society into two groups, the public who must be 
modernized, and the bureaucratic state elites who would modernize them. In this 
situation, it can be argued that civil society could not be accommodated. 
   
 In the single party period, the main determinants of the state-society 
relation were CHP (The Republican’s People Party), the single party in the 
political sphere, the Etatist policies in the economic realm, and the ongoing 
modernization process at the societal level.97 These principles of the Kemalist 
regime ensured the supremacy of the state elites over civil society in Turkey.   
     
 Trade unions, free associations, political parties, and the freedom of the 
press and meeting were not permitted in the single party period.98 In addition, the 
Kemalist principle accepting the Turkish people as classless, unprivileged and 
homogenous resulted in an obscure magma in which the whole society could not 
unearth their real identities that are the core of the civil society. 99   
 
 In fact, while civil society was the ideal of the bureaucratic elites, the 
autonomy that was necessary for its emergence was seen as dangerous by the 
                                                 
97 Gulgun Erdogan-Tosun, Demokratiklesme  Perspektifinden  Devlet-Sivil Toplum Iliskisi, (Alfo 
Basim: Isnabul-Bursa, 2001), 260.   
  
98 Fikret Toksoz gives several examples of these banns and restrictions. Fikret Toksoz, 
‘Dernekler’, in Gulgun Erdogan-Tosun,  Demokratiklesme  Perspektifinden  Devlet-Sivil Toplum 
Iliskisi, (Alfo Basim: Isnabul-Bursa, 2001), 261-262.  
 
99 Ali Gevgili, Turkiye Basini, (Iletisim Yayinlari: Istanbul, 1986), 213.  
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bureaucratic elites.100 The result of this ambivalence was only the partial rise of  
civil society in Turkey.        
 
 
3.3. Pre-1980 Period 
 
Through the beginning of the multi-party period in the 1950s, a new era appeared 
for the development of civil society. Civil society elements that were banned in 
the single party period reemerged with the coming to power of the Democrat 
Party. In this period, a society that had been subject to homogenization in the 
single party period started to alter.  
  
 Toprak asserts that the thirty-year period between 1950-1980 was 
characterized by the struggle to institutionalize party politics, establish democratic 
procedures, guarantee civil rights, and legitimize civil associations.101 It is 
claimed that the 1950s were the initial years for the shaping of civil society in a 
new format. Along with the articulation of opposite views, the number of political 
parties, the media organizations and the associations as well as the unions 
increased.102 However, those working at strengthening civil society had to be 
careful about anti-communism and Secularism.  
                                                 
100 Murat Belge, ‘Sivil Toplum ve Turkiye’, in Gulgun Erdogan-Tosun,  Demokratiklesme  
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102 Erdogan-Tosun explains the establishment of Human Rights Association, of Turkish Socialist 
Labor and Peasant Party, of different kind of trade unions in these years.   Gulgun Erdogan-Tosun, 
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The reasons for the reemergence of civil society in Turkey, as suggested 
by Toksoz, were the speeding up of capitalism in Turkey as well as throughout the 
world, migration from the village to the city, the visibility of the social classes and 
the transition to the multi-party democracy.103   
  
 Ozbudun states that the development of associational life received a 
further boost with the adoption of the liberal 1961 Constitution, recognizing the 
right to association, and stating that ‘everyone possesses the right to establish an 
association without obtaining prior permission’.104 Hence, the number of 
associations multiplied between 1960 and 1971. According to him, Turkish 
associational life is composed of two major legal types of organizations: dernekler 
(private associations) and kamu kurumu niteligindeki meslek kuruluslari (public 
professional organizations). Ozbudun uses the category defined by Philippe C. 
Schmitter to delineate associational life in Turkey.  For Schmitter,  
 
Pluralism can be defined as a system of interest representation in 
which the constituent units are organized into an unspecified 
number of multiple, voluntary, competitive, no hierarchically 
ordered and self-determined categories.  
Corporatism can be defined as a system of interest representation in 
which the constituent units are organized into a limited number of 
singular, compulsory, noncompetitive, hierarchically ordered and 
functionally differentiated categories.105 
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Ozbudun explains that private associations fit the pluralist model, while public 
professional organizations approximate the corporatist model.106  
 
 Nevertheless, it can be argued that there was a lack of toleration toward 
opposite views and ideas in the years that led to the military coup in 1960. 
Ironically, the new constitution permitted an unprecedented growth in the number 
of political parties, interests groups, and civil associations due to guarantees of 
free speech and free association.107 In this sense, the relationship between the state 
and society seemed to benefit society.108 
 
 
3.4. The Post-1980 Period 
 
The post-1980 era was a turning point in terms of state-society relations in 
Turkey. The state-induced modernizing movement which had started in the mid-
nineteenth century and had become institutionalized during the 1920-1980 period 
came to an end as the leading paradigm.109 The post-1980 period witnessed the 
relative autonomization of economic activities, political groups, and cultural 
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identities that resulted in the formation of an autonomous societal sphere that was 
necessary for the emergence of civil society.  
 
The 1982 Constitution was designed on the basis of the military’s belief 
that the 1961 Constitution was weak because of unprecedented individual and 
group rights and liberties.110 The new Constitution put limits on basic rights and 
liberties, the organization and activities of political parties and voluntary 
associations in order for the protection of national and public concerns. The result 
of these restrictions was greater state control over both the legal arena and the 
institutional framework of civil society in Turkey.  
 
According to Toprak, the political discourse focused on two themes in the 
mid-1980s in Turkey: the consolidation of democracy and the strengthening of 
civil society. The concentration on the concept of civil society was because of the 
repeated involvement of the military in politics and the recognition by different 
groups influential in setting the political climate that isolated the generals from 
political projects depended on a consensus on democracy.111   
 
Another reason was the changes in the legal structure. The 1982 
Constitution was amended to the extent that the provisional article banning pre-
1980 party leaders from political activity for ten years was altered. So as to create 
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a pluralist democratic atmosphere in Turkey, the legal restructuring of the 
relationship between the individual as citizen and the state112 was needed. 
Turkey’s acceptance of international agreements on human rights was a major 
step in this restructuring. 
 
 The post-1980 period was the starting point of economic liberalism in 
Turkey. The change in the economy led to political liberalism. By 1980, the 
Turkish economy started to apply export-oriented growth policies under IMF 
directives. Such a change in the economy led to the emergence of liberalism in 
politics: society became increasingly characterized by the expansion of business 
life, the autonomy of the private sector from politics and the improvement of the 
life standards of the middle class leading to the increase in the number of 
voluntary organizations that were necessary for the expansion of civil society. 
 
 The dominant discourse of official ideology of the republican state 
declined in the 1980s. Toprak asserts that the universalistic claim of the 
Republicans was replaced by an individual autonomy that proclaims the 
recognition of ethnic and religious plurality, the tolerance of civil society, and 
sensitivity to Islamist and Kurdish demands for freedom of expression and 
organization. 113 
 
                                                 
112Particularly, the EU integration process is very influential for the building of legal structure. 
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Another important change in the post-1980 period was the bureaucracy, 
which had been the promoter of the state since the 17th century. The Turkish 
bureaucracy played the role of building a kind of ‘Western’ society especially 
during the early years of the Republic. Therefore, the bureaucracy was the one of 
the omnipotent actors of the regime. According to Caha, the Turkish bureaucracy 
was not the bureaucracy abstracted from social values; instead it had become a 
modern bureaucracy with sociological values.114 In the Turkish bureaucracy, 
social identities like Islamism, Alevism, and Kurdism emerged. 
 
According to Caha, the most important change occurred at the level of 
Turkish intellectuals who were the very significant partner of the political power 
during the Ottoman and Turkish modernization period.115 Although there was a 
separation of  ‘Left’ and ‘Right’ among intellectuals, generally speaking, they 
were in favor of the state and had the idea of the state’s superiority over  society. 
However, in the 1980s, they started to diverge from their traditional attitude 
towards the state, and place more emphasis on the importance of civil society, 
liberalism, Islam, democratic participation, human rights, and social democracy. 
Hence, the intellectuals were in a struggle for democracy in the 1980s.  
 
In addition, the Turkish media played a very significant role for the 
formation of civil society and for the limitation of the state. Firstly, the media 
became the focus of democracy and of the opposition to the state administrators 
who misused their duties. Second, especially the privatization of the media led to 
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the exploration of the democratic and anti-democratic regimens in the world; in 
turn the Turkish public gained the advantage of the evaluation of the Turkish 
democracy from an objective point of view.116  
 
In the 1980s, comprehensive topics such as modernization, national 
identity, and national solidarity were replaced by specific themes like ecology, 
human rights, health, religious, ethnic and women rights.  Politics was actualized 
around these topics. Such concepts were on the behalf of the society and groups 
rather than the state. 
 
In the 1980s, the socio-cultural parameters based on difference of 
ethnicity, of religious sect, of being urban or the villager, of respecting the values 
of the East or the West of Anatolia, of preference of either democratic or 
authoritarian regime appeared. Ugur argues that those parameters could not be 
fully developed because of the restrictions dealing with civil society in the 
Constitution and the laws.117 
 
The post-1980 period was a turning point in terms of civil society in 
Turkey. The development of civil society in the 1980s was based on the attempt 
to form an alternative to the traditional patriarchal state by civil society elements. 
In the 1980s, the image of the paternal state in Turkey was questioned. Caha 
claims that the state lost its transcendental feature; instead the state became an 
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entity that began to submit to differences in society. 118 Besides, the official 
ideology of the Turkish state, Kemalism, started to soften itself in the 1980s. For 
Caha, the close and dogmatic principles of Kemalism in the pre-1980 period 
began to be questioned. 119  
  
It is stated that Islam became a topic re-explored in the political arena in 
the 1980s and led to the refreshment of civil society in Turkey. According to 
Caha, civil society acquired new concepts and dynamics for political 
participation and protest by Islam.120 The most important example of the political 
and social protest was the demonstration by youth women who demanded the 
right to education in the universities with their headscarves.     
 
According to Ozdalga, social and political organizations based on the 
defense of Islamic ideology had contributions to make as important as the civil 
society organizations with a social-democratic, liberal, conservative, or 
nationalist inclination. It is argued that just as Kemalism has impeded as well as 
contributed to the growth of civil society, so Islam has also two opposite 
tendencies related to civil society, in the sense that every organization formed in 
the name of Islam is not unfavorable to the development of a democratic 
society.121 It is asserted that some civil society organizations have positive 
contributions to the development of civil society in Turkey in terms of education, 
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press, media and party politics. Ozdalga names those activities as the dynamic 
and pluralist aspects of the Islamic movement.  
 
The most radical discourse in the 1980s came form feminist groups. The 
feminist groups, denying the validity of all institutions in Turkish culture, opened 
a new era. They mainly criticized the patriarchal structure of the Turkish society. 
Therefore, feminist discourses strongly supported the reemergence of civil 
society in Turkey.   
 
It is clear that by the early 1980s, an autonomous civil society, active in 
the public realm and trying to limit the power of the state had developed. During 
the Republican period, it was believed that difference in groups would harm the 
public good; hence, the ties between citizens and social groups were prevented.122 
The discourse of unity and homogeneity of the state was emphasized in these 
years. However, the notions of unity and homogeneity were replaced by 
pluralism, and difference by civil society. 
 
Particularly in the 1990s, public trust in political society and the state 
deteriorated. Due to incompetence, corruption, or their challenge to secularism, 
the political parties in Turkey lost public confidence. 123 In such a situation, civil 
society started to be perceived as a new arena so as to articulate ideas and views.  
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In the 1990s, there was a demand for expansion of civil society from both 
external and internal forces. That was the time of pluralist democracy, civil 
society, human rights, and liberalism; hence many constitutional bans on the 
political activities of civil society organizations were lifted.  Especially, the 
abolition of the constitutional provisions banning organic or cooperative relations 
between political parties and such civil society institutions as trade unions, 
voluntary associations, foundations, public professional organizations and 
cooperative societies helped to promote the future growth of civil society.124  
 
The growth of civil society in the 1990s was linked to the decline of 
political society. According to Ozbudun, because of three maladies of the Turkish 
party system that are volatility, fragmentation and ideological polarization, a new 
way towards civil society opened up. Although Turkish politics are party politics 
in which the political party is the main unofficial link between the government 
and the larger, extra-governmental groups of people125, this characteristic of the 
Turkish party system started to change in the 1990s with the growth of civil 
society.  
 
For Bostanci, parallel to the decline of the influence of the military in 
Turkish politics, human rights, feminism, ecology, and youth movement as in the 
Western Europe started to appear on the scene in the 1980s. In addition, 
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Islamism, Alevism, Kurdism and Turkism  are traditional in essence, yet are 
embedded in the modern category have restructured in the 1980s.126 
 
Ozuerman gives different reasons for explaining the reemergence of civil 
society in Turkey in the 1980s. To begin with, the concept of civil society is not a 
construction that emerged as the outcome of a conscious attitude; rather civil 
society is an area consisting of expectations of democracy.127  The debate 
between the appointed and the elected questions the legitimacy of the 
representative democracy; hence civil society is formulated as the solution of this 
obstruct in the society.    
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CHAPTER IV  
THE CASE OF TUSIAD 
 
The visibility of the concept of civil society strengthened in Turkey in the 1990s. 
The dramatic political changes in Eastern Europe became a precedent for Turkey 
because of the assumption that “the development of democratic government 
depended not just on the establishment of the rules and state institutions of 
democracy, but the existence of strong social forces and structures, encouraging 
free debate, effective participation and mediation which would counterbalance 
and influence the forces of the state”128.  A vibrant and robust civil society is a 
prerequisite for consolidation of democracy.  
 
 In this chapter one of the most effective civil society organizations in 
Turkey, TUSIAD (The Turkish Industrialists’ and Businessmen's Association), 
is closely examined. The most important reason for choosing TUSIAD as a case 
study is that TUSIAD stresses the idea of democracy more than any other civil 
society organization.  Firstly, I shall examine the reasons for the establishment of 
TUSIAD. In the second part, state-business relations are considered in detail. 
Thirdly, the basic characteristics of TUSIAD and of the members of TUSIAD 
are analyzed. Fourthly, the objectives of TUSIAD and the role it plays are 
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presented. In the final part of the chapter, I shall concentrate on the report written 
by TUSIAD, Perspectives on Democratization in Turkey.  
 
 
4.1 Reasons for the Establishment of TUSIAD 
 
TUSIAD was founded as a result of social and political needs in Turkey in 1971. 
The first reason is inadequacy of TOBB (Turkish Union of Chambers) in 
representing the interests of the private sector. “Since membership in the TOBB 
was compulsory, the organization did not distinguish between large and small 
members, as both sets enjoyed the same rights”129.  Feyyaz Berker, the first 
president of TUSIAD, articulated the reasons behind the  need to establish a new 
autonomous association when there were two other representatives of business 
association: TOBB and the Chamber of Industry: 
  
“Like its counterparts in Japan, England, Germany, 
Sweden, Belgium and Greece, TUSIAD, was founded to 
set up strategies for the Turkish economy at a macro level 
which were in the nation’s best interest, as well as to bring 
the results of its beneficial research t the attention of the 
policy makers and public opinion... At the time, business 
organizations like TOBB and the Union of Chambers of 
Industry established according to act 5590- which 
membership was compulsory and were under close 
influence of political parties which were incapable of 
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shaping common economic and political programs to 
promote the general interests of Turkish private sector.”130   
   
  
 According to Bianchi, “the inability of the Union of Chambers of 
Industry to achieve more effective industrialist representation through existing 
corporatist structures has encouraged many industrialist to shift their efforts to 
the pluralist arena of voluntary associations.”131 Moreover, Ayse Oncu states 
that “dissatisfaction with the existing chambers such as lack of representation of 
big business in the elected bodies and discrepancies in the size and interests of 
the members was considered to be a problem.”132 Another reason is the 
challenge from the ‘Left’. The foundation of TUSIAD was stimulated by the 
growing power and influence of trade unions and socialist ideologies.  In the 
late 1960s and the early 1970s, there was an upsurge of the ‘left’ in Turkey.  
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 Ayse Bugra articulates the reasons for the establishment of TUSIAD as 
follows: 
 
“In the late 1960s, political and social movements have 
shown an unprecedented dynamism in the liberal 
atmosphere largely created by a really democratic 
constitution prepared. There was an increasingly strength 
of the left wing criticism of capitalism, even a greater 
hostility against the private sector. Such an increasing 
significance of left wing social movements and radical 
unionism has been an important factor for the foundation 
of TUSIAD.”133   
 
       
 Another point of view presuming the reasons of the establishment of 
TUSIAD is that TUSIAD emerged as a result of  “the revival of the Turkish 
economy and particularly of the private sector in the 1950s and 1960s”134.  In 
this period, the private sector was divided between the small and/or middle 
scale enterprises and big holding companies. TOBB was unable to represent the 
big business companies. Hence, a group of leading businessmen in the country 
founded TUSIAD.  
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4.2. Basic Characteristics of TUSIAD  
 
TUSIAD is a heterogeneous group that represents big business and holding 
companies in Turkey. TUSIAD member companies are fairly large enterprises, 
mainly located in Istanbul. As of February 2001, it had 458 members135. The 
overwhelming majority of the association’s members are well-educated people 
who are university graduates136. Most of the members of the association know 
at least one foreign language. Its membership is composed of owners and 
managers of individual firms, groups of companies and holding companies 
operating in the Turkish manufacturing and service sector137. Hence, Ayse 
Bugra articulates TUSIAD members as an elite group who, not only by virtue of 
the small number, large size and geographical concentration of their enterprises, 
but also thanks to their socio-cultural background138.  
 
 However, Arat argues that TUSIAD is a small association with select 
membership ensuring homogeneity.139 Such homogeneity denotes relative 
homogeneity of interests regarding which macro-economic policies to 
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support.140 It is claimed that that selective membership also implies that the 
association has a strong financial base. Therefore, Arat states that with a small 
and cohesive membership, a strong financial base, and powerful leadership, 
TUSIAD was well equipped to pursue its goals.141  In this sense, it can be 
argued that that equipment gives TUSIAD the ability to impact to Turkish 
politics. 
  
According to Barkey, TUSIAD represents the largest of the commercial 
and industrial interests142. Similarly, Bianchi states that TUSIAD represents the 
largest and best-known entrepreneurs’ efforts to combine industrial and finance 
capital143.   
 
 
4.3. Main Objectives and Functions of TUSIAD  
 
The main of objectives of TUSIAD are expressed in the preface of the report, 
Perspectives on Democratization in Turkey as follows: 
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“TUSIAD is a non-governmental organization working for 
the public interest. Committed to the universal principles 
of democracy and human rights, together with the 
freedoms of enterprise, belief and opinion, TUSIAD tries 
to foster the development of a social structure which 
conforms to Ataturk‘s principles and reforms, and strives 
to fortify the concept of a democratic civil society and a 
secular state of law in Turkey, where the government 
primarily attends to its main functional duties.”144 
 
 
 The association’s goals are explained as serving Turkey’s democratic 
and planned development and its rise to the level of Western civilization. In 
addition, the basic objectives of TUSIAD are stated in its Charter as follows: “to 
advance the legitimate economic interests of leading industrialists; to improve 
the image of the private sector in general, and that of the businessmen in 
particular in the eyes of the political elites and the public at large; to function as 
a research body to keep the public informed about the group’s needs and 
opinions, and to help the government make policies in line with the interests of 
its members; and, lastly, to promote public welfare through free enterprise.”145 
 
 According to Bugra, the social role of the association became 
increasingly important in the 1980s, in an international and domestic 
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environment where political developments were clearly favorable to the private 
sector.146  
 
 The ultimate objective of TUSIAD is to make the business community 
take an active part in the political life of the country and contribute to policy 
debate. It is believed that such a thing will constitute a major change in the 
traditional role of business organizations that consisted of manipulating 
politicians by giving individual favors in return for the satisfaction of short-term 
economic interests147. Furthermore, TUSIAD defines itself as an association 
that “aims at establishing the legal and institutional framework of the market 
economy and ensuring the application of internationally accepted business 
ethics.”148  
 
  The philosophy of the association articulated by Sahap Kocatopcu, 
former president of the association, as follows: 
 
“TUSIAD will be close to the governments according to 
the degree of their loyalty to a free market economy and a 
mixed economy. But this does not entail being close to a 
political party... If we wish the dialogue with the 
government to continue, TUSIAD should know to keep its 
mount shut.. Many persons who are in fierce competition 
with each other in many fields of business have agreed on 
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a common denominator in TUSIAD. The points are agreed 
upon are: Defending democracy; staying outside the orbit 
of a political party; giving priority to the country’s 
interests.”149   
 
 
TUSIAD has played a leading role in the promotion of democratization in 
the context of the 1990s.150  For the first time, TUSIAD published a number of 
different reports designed to highlight certain inherent deficiencies of the 
democratic order and to propose ways of overcoming those deficiencies, and 
enhance democracy in Turkey.151  In the 1990s, TUSIAD has concentrated on 
‘good governance’ for the purpose of establishing a new pattern of relations with 
the state designed to put an end to the highly discriminatory and clientelistic style 
of interactions based on individualized and personalized access to state 
resources.152 TUSIAD has stressed a smaller, accountable and neutral 
government. Thus, stability, predictability and accountability have been the key 
concerns of TUSIAD for democratization.     
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4.4. Business- State Relations 
 
There is always a tension in the relationship between the state and business in 
Turkey. Such tension was manifested in several times in a way that “impatient 
state authorities accuse private businessmen of thinking about nothing but their 
private interests, being engaged in speculative activities or not contributing to 
the economic development of the country.”153 The reason is that the role of the 
state in the Turkish economy has been crucial considering its impact on private 
sector development.  
 
 State support by different forms, the business sector has always been 
considerable in Turkey. The private sector has grown in an environment 
protected against foreign competition, benefiting from state contracts for 
infrastructure projects relying on subsidized credit and cheap inputs provided by 
public enterprise. Beside, “individual businessmen have received favors from 
the political authority which has often acted in a way to undermine the legal and 
bureaucratic mechanisms of intermediation in state-business relations.”154 
 
 According to Bugra, it was mainly in this environment that the 
association began to question and “contest the historical legacy of the highly 
unequal partnership between state and business, in which the state appeared as 
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the dominant partner.”155 Such a state-business relationship was challenged by a 
group of big businessmen whose aim was a secure basis for their property and 
sufficient space to enable them to exercise their hegemony as the dominant 
class. 
 
 With respect to state-business relations, TUSIAD is making an attempt 
to redress the balance of power between the state and the big business 
community on the behalf of the latter.    
 
 
4.5.Views on the Report 
 
TUSIAD has become active in Turkish politics by dispersing information so as 
to shape public opinion in the 1990s. In its publications, TUSIAD has criticized 
the traditional role of the state in the Turkish economy and society. In the 
report, Perspectives on Democratization in Turkey, “a boldly critical stand is 
adopted in the evaluation of certain legal and social problems which hamper 
social stability and create the risk of isolation from the Western world.”156  
 
 The significance of the report is due to the fact that TUSIAD criticized 
sensitive issues which are usually untouchable in Turkish politics, such as 
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freedom of expression; an extension of the language; cultural rights; and the 
need, and institute civilian control over the military. The report dealt with and 
suggested deep reforms in the two key areas which are the most troublesome 
and problematic157 aspects of Turkish democracy; minority rights and the 
pervasive role of the military in Turkish politics. 
 
 According to Ozbudun, “TUSIAD has recently taken an active interest 
in democratization. Its well-publicized report, Perspectives on 
Democratization in Turkey received a good deal of attention and gave rise to 
discussions both within the association and among the general public.”158Ayse 
Bugra says the report  “probably constitutes the most important item in the list 
of TUSIAD publications.”159  
  
 The report was presented to the President of the Turkish Grand 
National Assembly, Mustafa Kalemli. Then, Halis Komili, the president of 
TUSIAD, offered the report to the Chief of the General Staff, Ismail Hakki 
Karadayi. This visit was explained as the ‘civilian intervention’ because of the 
content including the military. 
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Parties, Civil society and Democracy’, held in Bilkent University, Ankara, Turkey, April 27.28, 9. 
 
158 Ergun  Ozbudun, 1995. Politics in developing countries : comparing experiences with 
democracy. Larry Diamond ed. (Boulder: L. Rienner Publishers), 134. 
 
159 Ayse Bugra, 2001. “Class Strategy and Private Interest: The case of the Social Project 
Promoted by TUSIAD”. Paper presented at the Conference on “Civil Society and Democracy”, 
held in Bilkent University, Ankara, Turkey, April, 14. 
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 Komili stated that the political regime could not renew itself since the 
suppression of the opposing views was preferred for the purpose of the 
maintenance of the political power.160 According to Komili, TUSIAD diverges 
from a political party to the extent that it has no political expectations; hence, 
the report was prepared without short-term political interests in mind.161  
 
 Media reactions varied. In the media, the report was described as an 
honor for Turkey “since it was the first time that a civil society organization in 
Turkey consisting of a group of businessmen took a bold and right step on the 
question of democratization. It was a great contribution to Turkish 
democracy.”162  
 
 According to Candar, only TUSIAD is able to propose suggestions 
regarding the reestablishment of the state and is able to make serious changes in 
this respect.163  For him, the trickiest part of the report was the part regarding 
the issue of civilianization, in which military authority is subject to civilian 
authority in a democratic system, and the functions of defense and internal 
security are separate (hence, the military authority is concerned solely with 
national defense, while responsibility for domestic security is undertaken by the 
civilian authority)164 With regard to the Kurdish question, the diagnosis and 
suggestions were qualified to a certain extent. 
 
                                                 
160 January 21, 1997, Sabah, 
161 January 21, 1997, Sabah, 
162 January 22,1997, Sabah. This comment was made by M. Ali Birand. 
163 January 23, 1997,Sabah. 
164 TUSIAD Report 
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 According to Atikan, TUSIAD perceived that it was necessary to be a 
part of democracy in Turkey so as to become a part of the integration to the 
world.165 Also, she states that the report was significant in reflecting the 
evolution of TUSIAD as an instrument for criticizing the regime.166 Toker 
asserts that different sectors criticized aspects of the report that overlapped its 
interests.167 
 
 A strongly critical view held that TUSIAD was against the 
indivisibility of the country, and in favor of the ‘separatist groups’ and 
fundamentalists, and wanted to harm the basic institutions of the state.168 M. Ali 
Birand interprets this view as being directed towards sustaining the existing 
regime, and not to lose authority in the hands of some people or institutions. 
 
 
4.6. An Analysis of the Report 
 
The reasons for the report being prepared were explained in the foreword of the 
report: 
 
 “The Susurluk investigation169 had been closed and 35 
people had been convicted; a young woman’s religious 
convictions were exploited and she was later abused by the 
                                                 
165 January 23, 1997, Hurriyet. 
166 It is argued that TUSIAD supported the 1980 military intervention, but now TUSIAD is in 
favor of democratization. 
167 January 31, 1997, Milliyet. 
168 January 23, 1997, Sabah. 
169 There was a car accident in Susurluk. A politician, a polis chef, and a mafia leader were in the 
same car. This accident was so important that a sort of patron-client relation appeared.  
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leader of her religious sect; Ozdemir Sabanci was 
assassinated; it was the first anniversary of journalist 
Metin Goktepe’s170 death in police custody; and it was the 
moment when the graverobbers who had stolen the corpse 
of Turkey’s beloved and distinguished Vehbi Koc were 
arrested. All these events form an embarrassing picture of 
democracy, human rights, clean politics/clean society and 
humanity in Turkey.”171 
 
 
 In this context, TUSIAD, while trying to find ways of strengthening 
and stabilizing the economy, also emphasized the need to eliminate the 
deficiencies of Turkish democracy insofar as political instability was no longer 
an obstacle in the path of economic development.  
 
 Apart from these, there had been a growing tendency toward 
democratization and democratic consolidation around the world172. Political 
parties were unable to produce alternative ideas, while “dispersion and 
fragmentation in political life is the main trend. Parties of the center are losing 
strength while those of the extreme right are on the rise.”173 Finally, according 
to TUSIAD report, lack of trust in civilian political institutions was becoming 
more widespread. 
                                                 
170 He was a journalist. It was argued that he was killed by the police. This is also an important fact 
in Turkey by showing the pressure on the media as well as by implying that there has still been 
torture and human rights violation in Turkey.  
171 TUSIAD Report,Perspectives on  Democratization in Turkey. 
172 TUSIAD Report,Perspectives on  Democratization in Turkey,  p. 2 
 
173 Ergun  Ozbudun, 1999.Contemporary Turkish Politics: Challenges to Democratic 
Consolidation. (London: Lynne Reinner). 
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 The report consists of three parts: Political dimension, human rights 
and state of law. 
 
 
4.6.1 Political Dimension 
 
The political dimensions of democratization include issues concerning political 
parties,  elections (the manifestation of the national will) and the activities of the 
Grand National Assembly.   
 
 The TUSIAD report argues that there were many problems in the 
definition of political parties. “Political parties are organizations whose goal for 
the nation is to reach the level of contemporary civilization within a democratic 
order of state and society by ensuring the formation of the national will...(Article-
3 of the Constitution).”174 According to the report, of the two criteria included in 
the above wording, one is too narrow and the other completely unnecessary. The 
expression "ensuring the formation of the national will" is correct and appropriate 
but not sufficient.  
 
Another problem regarding political parties arises from the phrase 
“political parties are the indispensable elements of democratic political life, and 
                                                 
174 TUSIAD Report, Perspectives on Democratization in Turkey, 18. 
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they operate in loyalty to the principles and reforms of Atatürk (Article 4).”175 The 
criticism of this phrase is that the first sentence of the paragraph is simply a 
reiteration of the provision contained in the Constitution; however, the second 
sentence is completely unnecessary and even dangerous. It is claimed that “to 
operate in loyalty to the principles and reforms of Atatürk" is related neither to the 
property of being a political party nor to the "indispensable" character of political 
parties; it is even alien to these.”176 Moreover, "the principles and reforms of 
Atatürk" are something whose legal content is difficult and even impossible to 
define. There is no consensus even among historians on what those "principles" 
are, and it is very natural that there should not be. In order to see the diversity of 
opinion on this issue, it is enough to look at the textbooks on this subject. 
 
 TUSIAD proposes that the words “they operate in loyalty to the principles 
and reforms of Atatürk” should be removed from the text of the law. The most 
important problem regarding political parties concerns protection of the 
democratic state order. TUSIAD argues that the words “may not pursue the goal 
of changing the principles laid down in the Preamble to the Constitution” in 
Article 78/a of the LPP should be removed from the text. Concerning political 
parties, another issue is related to Article-81. According to that Article, political 
parties shall not: 
 
                                                 
175 TUSIAD Report, Perspectives on Democratization in Turkey, 19. 
 
176 TUSIAD Report, Perspectives on Democratization in Turkey,. 19.  
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a) argue that there exist in the territory of the Republic of 
Turkey any minorities based on differences of national or 
religious culture or differences of sect, race or language; 
b) pursue the goal of disturbing, or seek to disturb, the 
integrity of the nation by creating minorities in the 
territory of the Republic of Turkey through protection, 
development, or promotion and dissemination of 
languages and cultures other than Turkish language and 
culture; 
c) use any language other than Turkish in the drafting and 
publication of their statutes and programmes, and in their 
outdoor or indoor meetings, rallies and propaganda 
activities, use or distribute placards, posters, records, audio 
and video tapes, brochures and declarations written in a 
language other than Turkish, or remain indifferent to the 
commission of such acts and actions by others, save that 
they may translate their statutes and programmes to a 
foreign language other than one which is prohibited by 
law.”177 
  
 
 TUSIAD claims that this Article is too excessive and makes the legal 
system anti-democratic and gives it a chauvinistic and authoritarian nature. The 
democratic and rational approach requires that political parties seeking to 
represent different ethnic and religious identities, as long as that they are not 
separatist, should not be excluded from the system but included in it. 
 
                                                 
177 TUSIAD Report, Perspectives on Democratization in Turkey, 24. 
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 With respect to the political dimension, elections should also be 
considered, since elections are the most important channel through which the 
national will is manifested. 
 
TUSIAD asserts that with regard to the principle of free and equal 
competition in the electoral system, it is obvious that certain problems exist. As 
mentioned above provisions of the LPP including the prohibitions on political 
parties and the grounds for their dissolution, confine parties to narrow limits. 
According to TUSIAD, “in a political arena surrounded by so many prohibitions, 
it is not possible for political parties and candidates to compete freely and 
equally.”178 The abolition of those provisions and their replacement with more 
democratic ones are necessary not only for the freedom of political parties but 
also for free and equal elections. 
 
 It is argued that there has been no stability with regard to electoral systems 
in Turkey, with a different system used in every election. None of the political 
parties can be said to be pleased with this situation and with the existing 
system(s). However, neither can they agree on a lasting system. The problem is 
that the present electoral system is a proportional system with only a national 
threshold 10 percent. None of the parties is able to obtain a majority in parliament. 
Returning to the issue of what amendments should be made within the existing 
system, it may be useful to start discussing it with regard to the national threshold 
of 10 percent. In western democracies that have a national threshold in their 
                                                 
178 TUSIAD Report, Perspectives on Democratization in Turkey,. 26. 
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respective electoral systems, it is around 5 percent on the average.  It should not 
be overlooked that the failure of some of the parties to enter parliament could 
result in graver political instabilities. On these grounds, the proposal of TUSIAD 
is to reduce the national threshold to around 5 percent. In addition, it would be 
useful to adopt the "preferential voting" system which allows a voter to choose not 
only a political party but also a particular candidate.  
 
 
4.6.1.1.Human Rights 
 
The general provision of the Constitution relating to the restriction of fundamental 
rights and freedoms is Article 13. According to the provisions here, fundamental 
rights and freedoms may be restricted both on special grounds indicated in the 
relevant articles and on general grounds indicated in this article. These general 
reasons are listed as follows: “the indivisible integrity of the State with its 
territory and nation, national sovereignty, the Republic, national security, public 
order, general peace, public interest, public morals and public health.”179 
 
 For TUSIAD, another variable which closely concerns the functioning or 
non-functioning of democracy is the state of intellectual freedom. To this group, 
freedom of religion, freedom of thought, freedom of press and freedom of 
association ought to be added.  
 
                                                 
179 TUSIAD Report, Perspectives on Democratization in Turkey, 1. 
 
 67 
 With regard to freedom of religion, TUSIAD asserts that  there are at least 
two significant examples of unjust interventions in freedom of belief by law and 
legislation. The first is compulsory religious education, and the second example is 
“the provision in the 1st paragraph of Article 43 of the Civil Status Law No. 1587 
dated 5.5.1972 that a person's ‘religion’ be indicated in his birth registration.”180 
The contradiction here is that the ‘laic’ State that ought to remain neutral 
regarding Islam and other religions has itself come to occupy the position of being 
a religious propagator.  
 
 Another point is that TUSIAD claims that the State possesses three main 
channels for religious propagation and instruction: The Department of Religious 
Affairs; high schools for the training of religious functionaries; and compulsory 
religious classes in primary and secondary education. TUSIAD comments that the 
last two are the first to come to mind when one addresses the subject of religious 
training. 
 
 Regarding human rights, the other type of freedom is the freedom of 
thought. In pluralistic-liberal democracies, the phrase ‘freedom of thought’ 
signifies the freedom of expression. This freedom occupies a privileged position. 
“The doors are open to the expression of thought and its defense and closed to 
‘Thought Crimes’.”181 
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 However, there are restrictions on the freedom of thought. Regardless of 
method or objective or idea, no written or verbal propaganda and meetings, 
demonstrations and marches may be held that aim at “impairing the indivisibility 
of the Republic of Turkey” according to the Constitution. Those who do so shall 
be subject to the law. The specific problem for scientific work is the 'thought 
crimes'. The main problem for works of art on the other hand, is with the 
administration. Artistic works such as films, musical pieces, videos, and plays are 
frequently faced with such acts of the administration as censorship, control, 
banning, and even outright destruction (of films). 
 
 Musical performances, concerts and other audio-visual performances have 
also been subjected to strict controls. Concerts and video and music cassette tapes 
can be banned. In such administrative measures it is again the governorships that 
play the major role, but the influence of the ministry in the background is 
discernable. In other words, a political structure obstructs scientific and artistic 
production. TUSIAD proposes that the Provision of Article 27/2 of the 
Constitution which restricts the freedom to promote science and arts. “In addition 
to legal prosecutions, another threat to the freedom of press is the precautionary 
measures and decisions involving prevention of distribution, suspension of 
publication, seizure, banning of the entry to the country and distribution of 
publications.”182  
 
                                                 
182 TUSIAD Report, Perspectives on Democratization in Turkey, 24. 
 
 69 
 TUSIAD asserts that the state should take the necessary measures to 
ensure the freedoms of press and information in accordance with the needs of a 
pluralistic society. “Freedom of the press and freedom to obtain information 
should be limited to the purposes of protecting secrecy required by national 
defense, or public morality, of preventing attacks on individuals' honor, dignity or 
rights, or prevention of crime, or of ensuring the proper functioning of the 
judiciary.”183 
 
 Regarding human rights, the last issue is the Kurdish question. Several 
deficiencies and defects are observed in Turkey, and TUSIAD makes several 
recommendations. A direct or an indirect prohibition of Kurdish names and 
surnames appears. Until recently, application, too, was this direction, including 
judicial sanctions. According to the report, “by making the necessary 
modifications in the Civil Registration Law and related regulations, the ‘freedom 
to name’ should be ensured and the ‘national culture’ condition should be 
terminated.”184  
 
 The 1983 Law on Broadcasting and Publications to Be Made in Languages 
Other Than Turkish effectively banned Kurdish. However, this restriction was 
abolished by the latest amendments in 2001. 
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 In addition, TUSIAD argues that provisions of Articles 26 and 28 of the 
Constitution relating to "prohibited languages" should be taken out of effect. 
Finally, the Constitution defines citizenship as: “everybody bound to the Turkish 
State through the bond of citizenship is a Turk (Article 66/1).”185 The criticism of 
TUSIAD here is that this statement cannot be taken to mean “everybody in 
Turkey is Turkish” or “there are no Kurds in Turkey.” It is not possible to share 
interpretations and criticisms along these lines. The above formula relates solely 
to the definition of citizenship and is a legal formulation. It is not correct to 
extrapolate a cultural or social (ethnic) meaning from this. “TUSIAD regards this 
formulation of being a "Turk" as related to a legal bond, that is, "citizenship", and 
believe that keeping it within these limits is a democratic attitude.186 
 
 
4.7.Views on the Impact of TUSIAD on Democratization 
 
 
TUSIAD gives priority to the dissemination of information. Hence, the 
association has many publications, periodicals, and reports. The reports are related 
to economy, government, democracy, and education, EU. Conferences and 
seminars are arranged to discuss economic and social issues. The power to affect 
the economy and politics comes from the economic power of TUSIAD since there 
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is a very important capital behind TUSIAD.187 Thus, the opportunities that 
TUSIAD possesses enhance the influential power of the association.  
 
Also, the bargaining power, or pressure power in the words of Can 
Paker188, the chairperson of the Parliamentary Commission of TUSIAD, of 
TUSIAD comes from the credibility of the association in the eyes of the public. 
For him, TUSIAD receives its pressure power from the respect embedded in the 
public. 
   
According to Paker, the social and cultural structure of the Turkish society 
tends to protect the state.189 In Turkish history, the state has been beyond the 
individual. Therefore, Paker states that the experience of civil society protecting 
the rights of the individual in Europe differs from that of the civil society 
preserving the state in Turkey. However, TUSIAD, particularly in recent years, 
has tried to limit the state power, and control of the state by society. 
 
TUSIAD is aware of the fact that the role of the state in the economy 
should be limited; therefore TUSIAD urges the privatization of the economy. The 
very reason for this is that the Turkish bourgeois finds the guarantee of its future 
in democratic areas. 190 The Turkish bourgeois which developed under the 
protection of the state, then started to challenge to the state because the state 
prevented its further development of the bourgeois. TUSIAD, consisting of the 
                                                 
187Paker, Can. April 24, 2002. The interview with Can Paker. Istanbul, Turkey.  
188 Paker is against the concept of bargaining power since it is impossible to bargain something 
with the state by a civil society organization. 
189 The interview with Can Paker. 
190 The interview with Can Paker. 
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bourgeois, raises its voice as a civil society organization.191 In this sense, the 
significance of the association as a civil society organization has been increased. 
 
According to Paker, the impact of TUSIAD and its publications and its 
reports is not merely related to the question of how many of its suggestions are 
acted out law, but more importantly whether TUSIAD is influential in the 
preparation of the adequate environment for the consolidation of democracy in 
Turkey. 192 Paker claims that TUSIAD tries to fulfill its responsibility regarding 
the consolidation of democracy as a civil society organization. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
191 The interview with Can Paker. 
192 Can Paker always emphasizes this point in the interview. 
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CHAPTER V 
  CONCLUSION 
 
 
 
In the 1990s, there has been a growing impact of democracy on the development 
of civil society organizations because of the changes in the world such as the end 
of Cold War, collapse of the Soviet Union, increasing trend towards democracy 
and democratic consolidation everywhere in the world. The availability of a 
vigorous civil society is the prerequisite of democracy. There is an indispensable 
relationship between the democratic consolidation and civil society. In the second 
chapter, this relationship has been described. 
 
 In the third chapter, the development of the concept of civil society  and  
of civil society organizations in Turkey was explained. In order to clarify such 
development, the chapter was separated in to four parts; the Ottoman period, the 
Republican era, the pre-1980 period, and the post-1980 era. In these 
developments, changes in the Constitution were influential. The number of civil 
society organizations and their appearance on the public have rise in recent years.   
 
 TUSIAD, one of the most effective civil society organization in Turkey 
has been examined in the fourth chapter as an example. The influence of TUSIAD 
comes from its economic power and its selected members. The emphasis of 
 74 
TUSIAD on democracy has increased in the late-1990s because of its economic 
interests193. TUSIAD contributes democracy in ways that it promotes researches 
on education, elections, political parties, and European Union194, and draws public 
attention through media. 
 
 It is obvious that there can not be a clear-cut measurement of the impact of 
such an organization over democratic consolidation. This study tries to 
demonstrate that such a relationship is not impossible. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
193 This was claimed by Can Paker. 
194 www.tusiad.org 
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